Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) face limitations on their utilization in civil airspace because they do not have the ability to Sense and Avoid (SAA) other air traffic. In recent years, there has been growing interest to provide an effective SAA solution for UAS operations. An effective SAA solution must address both cooperative as well as non-cooperative air traffic. A number of different sensor solutions are being evaluated for SAA pertaining to non-cooperative traffic. Examples of such sensors include electro-optical (EO), on-board radar, passive acoustics, laser radar and ground radar. Using one or more such sensing modalities, it is possible to track a non-cooperative aircraft in the vicinity of the own aircraft otherwise known as an intruder. However, an intruder's future trajectory is never perfectly known and a SAA system's performance will always be limited by these uncertainties. One of the components of an SAA system is the logic to decide whether a certain aircraft is on a collision course with the own craft. It, therefore, follows that the performance of this collision detection component will also be limited by the uncertainties in the future trajectory of the intruder. In this paper, we investigate the problem of what is the best that a SAA collision detection system can perform in spite of the future uncertainties in the intruder trajectory.
I. Introduction
Currently, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) face limitations on their utilization in civil airspace because they do not have the ability to Sense and Avoid (SAA) other air traffic. To reduce the risk that UAS may pose to other air traffic and also to property and persons on the ground, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has strict rules for UAS to operate in the National Airspace System (NAS). As outlined in FAA Special Order 7610. 4 1 on Special Military Operations, military UAS need to obtain a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) in order to fly in the NAS. Civil UAS need to go through a complicated airworthiness certification process in order to conduct flight operations in the NAS. Until an effective SAA system is demonstrated, UAS operations within the NAS will be governed by the above rules.
In recent years, there has been growing interest in providing a reliable SAA solution for UAS operations. In the United States, government agencies such as the Air Force 2 , and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), research organizations such as the MIT Lincoln Laboratory [3] [4] and the MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation Systems Development (CAASD), and industrial corporations such as Northrop Grumman 1 have been actively working towards a SAA solution.
One of the requirements for a SAA system is the ability to detect and avoid both cooperative and noncooperative air traffic. Cooperative traffic can be detected using technologies like the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) and the Automatic Dependent Surveillance -Broadcast (ADS-B). The installation of TCAS and ADS-B is, however, not mandatory in all airspace classes and it is expected that even in the foreseeable future, air traffic in the National Airspace will consist of a mix of both cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft. Sensors to detect non-cooperative traffic include active sensors such as radar and laser radar, and passive sensors such as electro-optical and infra-red imaging sensors, and acoustic sensors.
other traffic in the vicinity alternatively known as intruders, (b) algorithms to analyze whether a detected intruder is on a collision course, and (c) a collision avoidance system to issue an avoidance command in case of a threat. It is clear that the overall performance of a SAA system depends on the performance of each of the three individual SAA components.
Research on SAA collision detection has, so far, focused on being able to correctly identify the current state of the intruder aircraft and using the current state and its associated uncertainty to predict the trajectory of the intruder in the future to see whether it is on a collision course. The uncertainty in the state of an intruder is dependent on the specific SAA system being used. However, assuming perfect knowledge of the state of the intruder, it is still true that there is uncertainty in the future trajectory of a non-cooperative intruder. This uncertainty on the intruder's future trajectory limits the performance of any SAA collision detection logic. In this paper, we study the problem of finding out the best collision detection performance any SAA system can deliver in spite of the uncertain future trajectory of the intruder. In other words, we seek to compute upper bounds on the performance of a SAA collision detection system for non-cooperative intruders.
To compute the upper bounds, we consider the hypothetical case of an ideal sensor system that is able to obtain error free estimates of an intruder's position and other states. We propose candidate collision detection rules which use the intruder's current state information along with the own aircraft future flight plan to predict possible collisions. We evaluate the performance of these collision detection rules via extensive Monte Carlo simulations. To conduct the Monte Carlo simulation, we generate encounters representative of how they occur in the National Airspace. We use the Encounter Model developed by MIT Lincoln Laboratory which is the highest fidelity model available yet for modeling encounters as they occur in the National Airspace. Through these simulations, we evaluate the effects of various collision detection rule parameters and system specifications such as the dimensions of the safety region around an aircraft on the algorithm performance.
Since we assume that we can estimate the state of an intruder exactly, the resulting performance results reflect an upper bound of the performance that can be achieved with any practical SAA system for the particular collision detection algorithm used in this paper. Notice that results may differ if another collision detection algorithm is used instead of the one presented in this paper. However, it is our belief that an understanding of the effect of the different parameters and system specifications on the performance of the algorithm proposed in this paper will also provide insight into how the same parameters affect other collision detection algorithms as well. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at providing such insights on the performance bounds for a SAA system. The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents preliminary concepts that will be used throughout the paper. Section III introduces some candidate collision detection rules and discusses their performance as a function of the various parameters of interest. Section IV contains conclusions and directions for future work.
II. Preliminaries
As mentioned in Section I, in this article we try to seek an answer to the question of what is the best that can be done with any SAA system given that there is always some uncertainty associated with the future trajectory of an intruder aircraft. In this section, we first briefly describe encounter generation using the MIT Lincoln Laboratory model. Second, we introduce the intruder aircraft dynamics model we assume in the paper and how we validate it. Finally, we discuss the metric we use to evaluate the performance of a collision detection algorithm.
II. A. Generating encounters reflective of NAS encounters
The MIT Lincoln Laboratory encounter model is the highest fidelity encounter model generated till date using radar data collected from sites across the United States. Flight trajectories in the model are represented using a dynamic Bayesian Network. The variables in the model include airspace class, altitude layer, airspeed, acceleration, turn rate, and altitude rate. Given initial values of the model variables, new values of acceleration, turn rate and vertical rate are obtained for the next time instant. These variables, acting as inputs to the aircraft dynamics model, can be used to generate the intruder trajectory. For more details please refer to Kochenderfer et. al 3 . To generate the encounters, we follow a procedure similar to the one described in Kochenderfer et. al 3 . Without loss of generality, the own aircraft or the sensor is initialized at the origin of an inertial frame of reference with a zero heading. The intruder aircraft is initialized on the surface of an encounter cylinder which is centered at the sensor aircraft. . The appropriate encounter cylinder dimensions depend on the own aircraft flight dynamics and collision avoidance system as pointed out in Kochenderfer et. al 4 . The subsequent states of the intruder and the sensor are generated using a dynamic Bayesian Network till either a near mid air collision occurs or till the intruder is no longer within the encounter cylinder centered on the own aircraft or till the duration of the encounter is 300 seconds. This last condition was set in order to limit the processing times to enable us to perform the extensive Monte Carlo simulations. It remains to be investigated whether this last condition has an impact on the overall performance results. A mid air collision is said to occur if the intruder position lies inside a safety cylinder of height safety 2H and radius safety R centered on the own aircraft. For the purpose of our experiments, a total of 300000 uncorrelated encounters were generated. Each encounter consisted of two aircraft belonging to same airspace class. The airspace classes belonging to the 300000 encounters are a mix of different uncontrolled airspace classes.
II. B. Aircraft dynamics model and validation Let ( ), ( ), ( )
x t y t h t denote the 3 dimensional position of an aircraft at time t . Let ( ) v t denote the airspeed and let ( ) t ψ denote the heading of the aircraft at time t . The heading corresponds to the direction of the vector ( ( ), ( )) 
The aircraft dynamics are given by: where
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For a given initial condition, the MIT Lincoln Laboratory model generates a time series of piecewise constant input vectors by sampling from a dynamic Bayesian network. The time period over which the inputs are constant is equal to 1 second. Given an initial condition and a time series of inputs, the aircraft dynamic model dictates the aircraft trajectory that is generated. To ensure that the dynamics model we have chosen is not oversimplified, we compared 50 sample tracks provided to us by MIT Lincoln Laboratory (LL) which were generated using their Collision Avoidance System Safety Assessment Tool (CASSATT) 5 . CASSATT typically uses a four degree of freedom model of an aircraft. The sample tracks consist of positions and inputs over a 50 second time horizon. Using identical initial conditions and inputs as the 50 tracks, the above dynamics model was used to generate the aircraft positions and compare them with the positions in the sample tracks. For each of the 50 cases, we recorded the maximum horizontal and vertical distances between the MIT LL tracks and the tracks generated by our model. The mean maximum horizontal distance is 45.15 meters with a maximum of 127.17 meters. The mean vertical distance is 0.244 millimeters with a maximum of 7.2 millimeters. This implies that the tracks generated according to our model are good approximations of the tracks generated by the CASSATT model.
II. C. System Operating Characteristics
The performance of a collision detection system can be measured in terms of its System Operating Characteristic (SOC) which is a plot of the achievable Correct Detection (CD) Rate versus the achievable False Alarm (FA) Rate 6 . A correct detection is defined as an event where in the system correctly identifies that an intruder is on a possible collision course and issues a collision avoidance command which in turn successfully prevents a near mid air collision. For our study, we define a correct detection event as one where the collision detection logic is able to correctly predict a near mid-air collision at least 10 seconds before the near mid-air collision (NMAC) event. A near mid-air collision event between the own craft and an intruder aircraft is said to occur when the intruder aircraft's American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics position lies within a safety cylinder centered at the own aircraft. On the other hand, a false alarm is an event wherein a detected intruder is incorrectly perceived as a threat. In this latter case, a collision avoidance command would be issued when in fact continuing on the nominal trajectory would not have led to a near mid air collision. An increased CD rate can be achieved at the cost of increased FA rate.
III. A Candidate Collision Detection Rule
So far, we have described the encounter model, the aircraft dynamics and the notion of system operating characteristics. In this section, we introduce a candidate collision detection rule and evaluate its performance as a function of a number of different parameters.
III. A. Collision Detection Rules
Let us assume that the SAA system on board the sensor aircraft is able to estimate the intruder states accurately without any errors. The intruder states include the 3D position, airspeed, heading, acceleration, and turn rate. As before, let ( ) t X denote the intruder states at time instant t . Then using this information, it is possible to predict the position of the intruder after a certain time T by simply integrating the aircraft dynamics defined earlier. Let this predicted position be denoted by pred (t T + X ) . Similarly, let sensor ( ) t X denote the state of the sensor (own craft) at any time t . We assume that the flight plan of the own craft is known precisely. Therefore, it is possible to predict the distance between the sensor and the intruder after any time τ . Let the predicted horizontal and vertical distances after a period of time τ from the instant t be denoted by pred ( We are now ready to describe a candidate collision detection rule. A collision detection rule is a map between the own aircraft flight path and current estimate of the intruder state to a binary decision. The decision can be either an alarm or a safe declaration. An alarm implies that the intruder is perceived to be on a collision course with the sensor. Since we have no knowledge of the intended flight path of the intruder, there is uncertainty associated with the future position of the intruder. The parameter γ is used to take this uncertainty into account. It is essentially used to scale the safety cylinder around the own aircraft by a factor of γ . An increase in the value of γ results in an increase in the probability of correct detection and, hence, in the overall correct detection rate, and vice versa. It, however, also results in an increase in the probability of false alarm. Assuming all other parameters are constant, increasing the value of γ from zero to positive infinity will increase both the false alarm rate and the correct detection rate and generate a System Operating Characteristic (SOC) curve. The parameter T is the length of the prediction horizon. At any given time t , we check whether the intruder's position is predicted to lie within the safety cylinder scaled by a factor of γ anytime within the next T seconds. Notice that the following result is trivially true.
Lemma III.A.2
If , 
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The above lemma implies that increasing the prediction horizon will increase the correct detection rate but, at the same time, also increase the false alarm rate. The overall effect on the performance with change in the length of the prediction horizon will depend on the relative changes in the correct detection and false alarm rates. As can be seen, the performance of the collision detection rule described earlier also depends on the parameters γ and T . It also combination, a SOC curve is generated by increasing the value of γ from zero to a sufficiently large number.
III. B. Effect of length of prediction horizon
We investigate the effect of the length of the prediction horizon on the performance of the collision detection rule ( ) 
III. C. Effect of safety cylinder dimensions
We also evaluate the effect of the safety cylinder dimensions on the performance of the collision detection rules. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 , the performance of the rule ) (⋅ T δ worsens with increasing safety cylinder dimensions.
For fixed values of T and γ , the correct detection rate increases with increasing dimensions of the safety cylinder.
The false alarm rate, however, increases at a greater rate causing the overall performance to decrease. The results reported in the previous section are based on a given collision detection rule. Notice that the collision detection rule ( ) T δ ⋅ makes no assumption about the underlying stochastic process which governs how aircraft trajectories evolve over time. An optimal collision detection rule should consider this stochastic process. It may be possible to derive the expression for such an optimal collision detection rule using the Neyman-Pearson lemma 7 assuming all the necessary technical conditions hold. However, such an approach runs the risk of becoming too complicated and computationally expensive for any real-time operation. If such an optimal rule is too difficult to derive, we would like to find out how well the performance of a candidate collision detection rule such as ) (⋅ T δ compares with the performance of the optimal rule. Or is it possible to derive sufficiently weak conditions under which a collision detection such as ) (⋅ T δ becomes equivalent to the optimal rule? To the best of our understanding, even these questions are difficult to answer.
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III. D. Optimality of the collision detection rule
In lieu of a definite answer to the question of optimality, we have tested a few other collision detection rules and compared the results with those of ) (⋅ 
, Figure 4 shows a plot of the SOC curve for ) ( ⋅ T δ when the prediction horizon length is equal to 30 seconds and the safety cylinder radius and height are equal to 500 feet and 100 feet respectively. Comparing the result in Figure 4 to the green plot corresponding to prediction horizon of 30 seconds in Figure 1 (left), we find that the performance of
Both the collision detection rules discussed account for the uncertainty in the future states of the intruder through the parameter γ . This parameter effectively scales the safety cylinder dimensions to account for the uncertainty. We now introduce another collision detection rule which has a different mechanism of taking into account the uncertainty in the future states. The following are the various steps involved in it. . The safety cylinder height and radius are equal to 100 ft and 500 ft respectively. The length of the prediction horizon is equal to 30 seconds.
• Given the true intruder state ( ) t X , we define a probability distribution which is a Gaussian centered at ( ) t X with covariance defined as follows. The covariance is a diagonal matrix. 
, respectively. All other diagonal elements are set equal to κ percent of the absolute values of the respective elements in X t ( ) .
• Let pred (t T + X ) and pred t T ∑ + ( ) denote the predicted mean and covariance after a time T . These quantities are computed using the intruder aircraft dynamics equations described earlier in Section II. For our experiments, we used the prediction horizon length T equal to 30 seconds, the parameter κ equal to 10 percent and sample N equal to ten thousand. The values of the safety cylinder radius and height are equal to 500 feet and 100 feet respectively. A SOC curve is generated by varying the value α from zero to one. The result is shown in 
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IV. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we studied the upper bounds of performance of a Sense-and-Avoid collision detection system for non-cooperative air traffic by assuming an ideal SAA sensor system able to derive error free estimates of the intruder states at any given time. We introduced a candidate collision detection rule and evaluated its performance using extensive Monte Carlo simulations with encounters generated from MIT Lincoln Laboratory encounter model. We investigated the effect of the length of the prediction horizon and the safety cylinder dimensions on the performance of the collision detection rule. It is found that increasing the length of the prediction horizon led to worsening of the performance of the collision detection rule. Likewise, it is found that increasing the safety cylinder dimensions led to decreased performance. We realize that the collision detection rule introduced in this paper may not be the optimal. However, comparison of its performance with two alternate collision detection rules showed that the performance of the former is superior to the latter two given an error free estimate of the state of the intruder. We also believe that the dependency of the collision detection rule introduced in this paper on parameters such as the prediction horizon length and safety cylinder dimensions may also offer insights on the dependency of an optimal collision detection rule on the same parameters.
Our studies indicate that the effect of uncertainty of the future trajectory of the intruder has some definite impact on the performance of a collision detection system that cannot be neglected. This impact is more pronounced for larger prediction horizons and larger safety cylinder dimensions. It must be noted, however, that shorter prediction horizons may look good for collision prediction, but not necessarily for collision avoidance. Similar studies involving all aspects of SAA are necessary. Other studies relating the effect of sensor noise on collision detection performance are needed to put lower bounds on the sensor capabilities.
For the experiments conducted in this paper, the initial conditions were chosen based on the dimensions of the encounter cylinder. These dimensions should be chosen depending on the aircraft dynamics and collision avoidance system 4 . Therefore, a study of the effect of these dimensions on collision detection performance is also necessary. The risk associated with a mid air collision has also been shown to be directly correlated with the airspace class 6 .The MIT LL encounter model can be used to generate trajectories from different airspace classes 7 . The effect of airspace class on system performance is also one of the avenues of future work.
